On modern and post-modern epistemology
ON MODERN AND POST-MODERN
EPISTEMOLOGY.
By
Alexander Koudlai
Epistemology is a
theory of knowledge or the whole field of such theories in philosophy which are
meant to increase our understanding of the term and of the phenomena. Examining
anything and everything we should collect all possible reflections and choose the
most agreeable of them to our soul, those which give us better understanding of
ourselves, the world and the process of "knowing" of internal,
external and mixed reality. This exanimation is done in solitude and in
dialogues with friends and interlocutors, in reading of monologues of other
thinkers who also very often examine other thinkers to the best of their
abilities. Some of us are better than others, meaning more talented to such
activities, and those produce better theories or choose the better ones from
the archives of ancient and modern history. Each of us adds something, even if
only in terms of new examples or small original generalizations. And if we do
it, i.e., read, listen, think and propose it reveals our love of knowledge,
even if we do not know exactly what knowledge is. As Socrates said in Symposium,
those are lovers who do not possess the object of their love. And lack of
knowledge (about knowledge) is a sign of our imperfection, but we are
constantly in the dynamic state of seeking, as history tells us, for already 25
centuries (and, I suspect, longer); and it is very unlikely that prophecies of
people like Nietzsche, E. Mach, Quine or Rorty about the end of
epistemology or philosophy will ever come true. Those people, like many others,
excited by some new ideas, often of scientific origin, were just carried away
at certain times, like somebody who fell in love with somebody new, and forgot
his first love for the time. For true philosopher his true love actually never ends,
and we would do better taking more care in valuing and respecting it. Nowadays
the world is too excited about everything external, material: clothes,
make-ups, professional escorts, entertainments, scientific magazines, prices,
prizes, diplomas and awards; it looses itself in pleasures and pains and
worships of new idols that would quench its cravings and fears. Many
celebrities appear and disappear with all that noisy clamor, and very often
they have all their awards, degrees and positions. But Socrates did not have
P.H.D, neither did Shakespeare; and still they are popular, at least among men
of sense, while not many of the new writers will survive their physical
death. Quine liked to justify sensual knowledge of the world in contrast to any
other paradoxical or a priori knowledge saying that the former helped us to
survive. Why the same argument cannot be used for evaluation of those theories
and authors who survived many centuries?
Of course, those great
thinkers like Plato and Euclid were criticized, but everybody will be, if he is
any good. In the process of such criticism we learn more about philosophy and
our knowledge, as well as the ways of its acquirement and sometimes see the
validity of the old ideas in the new light. I intend to criticize Quine and
Rorty, as well as the authors of the Modern Epistemology, Everitt and
Fisher.
I will argue in favor of TE (Traditional
Epistemology) and Foundationalism against NE (New Epistemology)
and Coherentism, as opposed to the former.
Everitt and Fisher
write:
Since there are no such foundations
, it is right to put epistemological tradition on one side. However if
we accept that coherence among our beliefs is the best we can hope for . . .
there is still much theoretical work to be done...
Quine argued that philosophy
should give way to science...
What has to be abandoned is the
search for certainty. What is left is the need to make sense of our experience
. . . this will take more than science alone . . . beliefs are justified by
their coherence with other beliefs and that justification is essentially public
and social . . . traditional philosophers have to take a back seat! (207-208)
It seems that human mind cannot
understand the world without foundations. Even the image of the web or
wigwam Quine proposed play the role of a foundation for understanding the
concept of coherentism. This very concept itself plays the role of foundation
for the whole theory of knowledge in this "new" fashion. E&F say
"no foundations" and "it is right to put..." it is an example
of foundational and dogmatic thinking.”If we accept... coherentism" it
will inevitably turn into another foundation. It is a logical problem.
If "philosophy should give way to science" what will deal with the
meaning of its data? This will lead to a psychological problem.
The fascination of
science in the XIX and XX century already affected the minds making them
mechanical and incapable to deal with the problems of human life. The great
writers, like Hawthorn (Rappachini's Daughter), Dickens (Hard Times),
Gette (in his critique of Newtonian theory of light), exposed a real problem.
Existentialism itself was a reaction on the mental inclination of the time to
artificial mechanical mode of thinking. To be able to act like a machine, even
as intricate as computer, does not presuppose to understand (keep in
mind the Chinese Room argument). And humans need both action and
understanding. No matter what Modernists and Post-modernists say, those two
differ from each other, because there are different levels of understanding
connected with the same action at different times and in cases of different
people. Some actions could be done without understanding at all, like in the
case of hypnotic suggestion, or mechanically under the influence of external
causes. So when we face real of imaginary difficulties with faundationalist
approach to epistemology why should we take another foundation in disguise of
coherentism?
Among other objections
to A Priori Foundationalism E&F criticize the Euclidean geometry on the pretext
of theories of Riemann and Lobachevsky. But the authors, as well as those who
are convinced by this line of thought, obviously do not have mathematical
background. Mathematicians know very well the concept of the area of applicability
of the algorithm. Euclidean theory is applicable only to plane surfaces,
and he never tried to apply it to spherical or curved ones. Riemann and
Lobachevsky in their turn never suggested applying their theories to the
planes. So there is no problem at all except learning of mathematics and using
its foundations properly. But the latter problem is not a problem of
epistemology.
The argument against
the logical law of the excluded middle by Quine and Putnam consists of
speculations about quantum mechanics. But physicists use terms wave and particle
to signify certain properties of a thing not the thing itself. When I
say, "I am strong and flexible", I talk about two different
properties of one thing, my body, and not about two mutually
exclusive characteristics. Who said that wave and particle
are mutually exclusive? A portion of a wave could be considered as a particle!
A limited quantity of energy is, in a sense, a particle. So here also there is
no real problem or threat to the concept of the excluded middle. I strongly suspect
that other objections to faundationalism could be resolved as well with
proper scrutiny.
So called philosophers of science
often refer to Einstein's theory of Relativity trying, and surprisingly
successfully, use it like a charm or religious dogma when they think it would
help them to impress non-physicists. But, like any physical theory, it has its
problems of different calibers, and those still have not reached the consensus
of professionals. Particularly the incompatibility of Einstein's and Plank's
views on probability, the unresolved problem of unified theory of field of
force and more. Einstein's efforts to explain gravitation through geometry of
space turned into tautology, which shows that he was not a great logician. But
it is easy to hypnotize naive people without real education in physics, who
seek new foundational re-assurances after being rapidly liberated from the old
ones, which they did not understand too much also, but liked to believe in them
anyway. This spirit of fast acquirement of new beliefs relates to the
spirit of our time: fast food (often cheap and not healthy), fast sex (often
confused and meaningless), fast shopping (often of items we do not actually
need). This is one of the reasons to argue for the philosophy, which traditionally
deals with all kinds of beliefs, regardless of time and effort, in its
dedication to the truth and clarity.
I argue that foundational
beliefs are necessary for the normal (healthy) functioning of our mind, and the
only choice available to us is the choice between different kinds of those, and
not between foundations and their annihilation. I think, Kant would agree to
include the foundational tendency into his Categories of Pure
Understanding. Still the category of Causality lies probably close to
that – when we look for the cause, we look for some foundational idea, which
explains an event or another idea, in a sense. And, yes, epistemologically we
can see the threat of infinite regress here, but in reality we stop somewhere
saying: "this link of the infinite chain is quite obvious or self-evident,
at least for the time. Later we doubt the link (the foundation) and immediately
look out for another link which at this time we are happy to accept as a new
foundation, cause or something with another name but bearing the same function
in our explanation and understanding of the event or theory. Of course, we can
distinguish between terms foundation and cause looking at them
from a certain perspective, but similarly we can do with any pare of words we call
synonyms. Good and wonderful, for example, mean the same when we
express our admiration of something of a superior quality, but very different
when we evaluate different qualities of the same object. He is a good man, or
he is a wonderful man (meaning his supreme kindness). She is wonderful (meaning
physical appearance) and at the same time she is not good (meaning her
mathematical gifts, or moral standing). So in conversation we just have to be
"on the same page" with our interlocutors. And when we think in
solitude we should use symbols for the phenomena of the same psychological
formation – we have to exercise our observational and nominational skills, and
also very good memory.
I would argue against
Wittgenstein's concept of the language as exclusively social phenomena.
Language has dual qualities. We may speak to ourselves as well as we can speak
to the others. Speaking to the others we intend to make them understand our
beliefs and experiences, while speaking to ourselves we intend our own minds to
understand something better. If we are extraverts our language becomes very social
indeed, and in this case Wittgenstein is almost right, but if we are
introverts there can be great deviations, and our language becomes very strange
for others (on those occasions we address them). People do not understand us;
think we are extravagant, crazy, or too smart. Still there are always social and
individual elements in our language and without individual specific qualities
of the latter conversations would be completely boring and meaningless! There
are peoples and there are persons!
I have to conclude this
paper saying that:
1. there are valid concepts in TE.
2.some new concepts of NE are not flawless
3.the new perspectives enrich our contemplative abilities and knowledge
4.the fully (for all times) satisfactory definitions or foundations are
not likely to be proposed – it would mean the end of our intellectual
development,
5.We have to respect great efforts of our ancestors and contemporaries to
make sense of the world, internal and external, and it means that epistemology
as well as philosophy at large is immortal!
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