The problem of hyper-inflation which had plagued Russia
earlier in the transition period has been replaced" by the dramatic
reduction in real wages and severe dilemma of arrears. By December 1995, real
wages declined by 13 percent and real consumption declined by 5.3 percent. Real
wage decline, and unexpectedly low levels of unemployment, can be attributed to
evasion of excess wage tax and inside the gate employment" by which
enterprise managers hoard labor by paying minimum wage and compensation workers
in non-taxable manners such as payment in kind, low interest long-term loans
that have questionable repayment terms. It should be noted that the Pension
Fund is becoming more experienced in detecting methods of tax avoidance and
recent action has been taken to close loopholes
Reduced inflation has given way to arrears as one of the
primary causes of poverty in the Russian Federation and has primarily been the
result of international pressure to reduce the budget deficit by ending
emission based methods of covering the deficit" and tax avoidance and
evasion. According to ITAR-TASS, pensioner were owed nearly 3 billion dollars
in October 1996. Revealing the revenue gap, 22 regions were able to make
pension payments while the remaining 69 needed transfers from the federal fund.
Wage arrears for both private and public sector were estimated at 43 trillion
rubles--9 billion of which was the state's responsibility.
An area of concern which was not addressed in 1992 and
continues to be a problem today is a rapidly deteriorating income distribution
between the regions of the Russian Federation. The disparities between the rich
and poor regions could possibly be the worst amongst all the federations.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
One of the greatest
obstacles to successful Russian market economic development is the absence of a
modern and effective tax system and lack of reliable data. Foreign capital
always seeks predictability, especially in terms of projecting tax liabilities.
Lack of a stable tax regime is the number one reason why Russia's direct
foreign investment dollar level is so low compared with other emerging markets.
A frequent and common concern expressed by foreign companies is the fear
(whether real or perceived) of an unstable, inequitable, unreliable, and
unpredictable tax system in Russia. As a result, capital that could potentially
be invested in Russia is instead invested in other countries that are perceived
as enjoying more stable tax systems. For Russia, it is time to introduce tax
breaks or other incentives by the end of the year for companies using
international accounting methods as part of a new business reform plan. For
example, companies which would follow these (international accounting)
standards will have their profit tax lowered by, say, five percent... or maybe
they will receive other privileges. Most Russian companies use domestic
accounting practices developed to calculate tax levels. Western accountants say
Russian accounting has limited use for business planning and investment. Below,
we have stated some suggestion and concerns regarding public finance in
transitional economies:
Before making any changes in the tax system the officials
have to think very carefully to avoid unplanned changes. For instance, the law
on the VAT has been changed 13 times since it was enacted. Proper tax reform
would also solve another of Russia's problems--its chronic budget deficit. The
country's inadequate system of tax revenue collection has been unable to keep
pace with the rise in government expenditure, leading to a budget deficit of
6.3 per cent of GDP in the first half of this year. According to Mr. Stuart
Brown, eastern Europe economist at Paribas Capital Markets, while fiscal policy
has been lax in Russia, monetary policy has had to bear the burden of reducing
inflation. The result has been high real interest rates. No wonder then that
several leading companies are looking abroad for capital. Reducing the budget
deficit, to reduce "crowding out" at home and allow fiscal policy to
take some of the burden in controlling inflation, must therefore be a priority
for the Russian government. The problem is that tax evasion and a culture of
non-payment in Russian industry, will hamper efforts to improve revenue
collection.
Regulate the movement of budget money by reorganize the
Russian treasury and concentrate all budgetary financial flows within it.
A good approach to battling non-compliance would be the
implementation of a unified computer information system to control revenues and
expenditures of the federal budget and state extra-budgetary funds, which
should contain taxpayers registration system and bring together information on
tax and customs duties payments, banking transactions and cash disbursements,
as well as data on tracing and utilization of the federal budget resources. But
it is still difficult to implement. First, Russia does not have high qualified
specialists in database and management information systems (MIS). Second, it
will require buying expensive mainframe computers what is critical under
collected (60 percent - percent) revenue. It is also important to decide what
kind of tax information is going to be the first to be put in the database. The
State Tax Service of the Russian Federation recently began this process by
requiring all taxpayers to indicate a personal taxpayer identification number
(PTIN) on payments and settlement documents for taxes and other levies
beginning on August 1, 1995. The rule as of January 1, 1996, states that a PTIN
should be included on all payment and settlement documents. Also Russia's State
Taxation Service is redoubling its efforts to stop commercial banks from hiding
income from tax authorities. The taxation service recently found that credit
institutions failed to transfer 3 trillion rubles to the state on time, and
that they have used legal means to hide their income. With the centralized
computer tax information system, it would be easier to observe taxpayers and
prevent tax evasion.
·
Reduce the cost of servicing the state debt.
·
Stop the emission of money.
·
Improve control over monopolies.
·
Reorganize the banking system. Set up a federal deposit of
insurance bond.
·
Reform ministry of finance and economy.
·
Diversification of the tax base.
Some services should be financed by taxes levied on local
beneficiaries. "Local taxes" are those over which local authorities
have some control. Which taxes to assign? The question is not easy for Russia.
In many market economies, the central government controls those taxes
considered to be most redistributive, such as personal income taxes, and the cyclical
corporate income tax, leaving more stable revenue sources levied on a
consumption base or property to the local level. For example, some federal
systems (the U.S., Switzerland, Canada) allow subnational corporate taxes, it
would be better for the federal government to set the corporate income tax. For
the transition economies, considerations of both administrative complexity and
allocative efficiency suggest that subnationally levied corporate taxes should
be avoided at the present time. Permitting the many small subnational
governments in the transition economies to set corporate tax rates (or adjust
the tax base) will allow substantial tax competition and differentiation in
enterprise taxation, influencing enterprise location decisions in perhaps undesirable
directions.
.The development of a more efficient and effective social
safety net in perhaps the most immediate and difficult task to accomplish in
the Russian Federation. Aside from cultural reasons outlined earlier, economic
growth cannot occur without social stability which will not happen until Russia
can design an effective system of coverage. Some possible ways to improve this
critical area are: diversify the tax base for social programs, redesign the
system of federal-sub-national relation which has made the latter bear an
unjust amount of the burden--unfair because of regional differences and
compounded by Soviet planning--, and make stronger attempts to reduce arrears
which is a difficult task due to the temptation to return to emission-based
methods of covering expenditure requirements.
APPENDIX
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